



NATIONAL COUNTER-TERRORISM PLAN

5TH EDITION 2024

AUSTRALIA-NEW ZEALAND **COUNTER-TERRORISM** COMMITTEE

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Counter-Terrorism Coordination Centre (CTCC)

Department of Home Affairs

PO Box 25

BELCONNEN ACT 2616

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PREFACE

1. The threat posed by terrorism and violent extremism to Australia and Australians continues to evolve.
2. The Australian Government and state and territory governments work together to combat this threat with a focus on prevention as the first line of defence against terrorism. Their actions are informed by thorough analysis and assessment of intelligence on terrorism and violent extremism here and abroad.
3. The Australian Government and state and territory governments – as well as the private sector and communities – work individually and collectively with the over-arching objectives of protecting lives, upholding our values, and bringing terrorists to justice.
6. The terrorist threat can manifest across jurisdictional boundaries, and it requires a nationally consistent and coordinated response. Despite our best efforts there can be no guarantees that a terrorist attack will not occur.
7. Terrorism remains a significant threat in some parts of the world and an emerging issue in others, and developments overseas could resonate here in Australia. International terrorist groups have proven adept at using their extremist ideology to motivate sympathisers and supporters to conduct terrorist attacks globally. Australians and Australian interests can and have been impacted by terrorist attacks.
8. Notwithstanding the significant time and effort put into legislation, resource allocation and capability development, the Australian Government cannot provide the whole solution to the terrorist threat. The private sector, local government and the community also have critical roles to play in Australia's counter-terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) efforts.

SECURITY CONTEXT

4. Terrorism continues to pose a direct and ongoing threat to the safety and wellbeing of Australians both in Australia and abroad.
5. The threat associated with violent extremist ideologies remains of concern to governments around the world. The ideological justifications for attacks are not limited to religiously motivated extremist ideologies, but also include terrorism based on other ideological or political beliefs – such as nationalist and racist, and specific issue violent extremism.
9. Cross-sectoral consequences that require a coordinated response between the Australian Government, international community/governments, jurisdictions, the private sector, and the community are well-served by arrangements established in the Australian Government Crisis Management Framework (AGCMF). We all need to work together to prevent terrorism, combat online

violent extremist propaganda and promote early intervention programs.

10. Up to date threat information and details regarding Australia's response to the terrorist threat can be found on the Australian National Security website at www.nationalsecurity.gov.au.

PURPOSE OF THE PLAN

11. Australia's National Counter-Terrorism Plan (the Plan) outlines the arrangements, governance and operational responsibilities of the Australian Government and state and territory governments and agencies engaged in counter-terrorism and CVE. It sets out the framework for preventative activities, the response to, investigation of, and recovery from, terrorist acts and the preparations to support these activities.
12. The Plan is underpinned by the prevent, prepare, response and recovery (PPRR) model. The PPRR model recognises that activities will be interconnected and will often occur concurrently.
13. The AGCMF sets out the lead Australian Government agency in the event of a crisis that requires whole-of-government coordination. States and territories are the first responders to any incident that occurs within their jurisdiction and have primary responsibility for the protection of life, property and the environment within the bounds of their jurisdiction.
14. The AGCMF also sets out the lead Australian Government ministerial and senior official roles, and details the tools and mechanisms that may be used to ensure a coordinated response.
15. The AGCMF lists key Commonwealth legislation and plans that may be applicable to the Plan, and details the arrangements for an Australian Government response to an international terrorist incident.
16. The Plan is supported by detailed documentation, including the National Counter-Terrorism Handbook (the Handbook).
17. The Handbook provides specific operational guidance for law enforcement and security agencies, as well as other government agencies acting in support of the Handbook. The Handbook is not publicly available.
18. The Plan recognises that counter-terrorism is a shared responsibility with all levels of government, the private sector and the community.
19. The Plan adopts the following approaches:
 - the Australian Government and agencies are committed to an intelligence-led approach to assessing the terrorist threat;
 - jurisdictions adopt a cooperative national approach to counter-terrorism, with a focus on interoperability; and

- in the interest of public safety, early disruption of planned attacks will often be prioritised over waiting to gather further evidence for a successful prosecution.

NATIONAL COORDINATION AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Commonwealth, State and Territory Responsibilities

20. Australia's counter-terrorism arrangements reflect Australia's federal system of government.
21. Tables 1 (see pages 10 and 11) and Table 2 (see page 12) outline the respective roles and responsibilities of the Australian Government, state and territory governments, private sector and community have in preventing, preparing for, responding to and recovering from a terrorist act.

Coordination Bodies and Inter-governmental-agreements

22. The Australian Government and state and territory governments and their agencies work together to align all aspects of Australia's counter-terrorism strategy. Within the inter-governmental framework, the bodies outlined in Figures 1 to 4 (see pages 13 - 16) have responsibilities for strategic-level coordination of counter-terrorism policy.

Table 1 – Commonwealth, State and Territory Responsibilities

States and Territories	Commonwealth
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintain counter-terrorism related policies, legislation and plans within their jurisdictions with a view to national consistency and interoperability; • Deliver public messaging following a change in the national terrorism threat level, in consultation with the Australian Government; • Contribute to national counter-terrorism related policies, legislation and plans, including the Counter-Terrorism Handbook; • Develop and maintain core counter-terrorism capabilities in the agencies listed in Annex A; • Lead surface transport security coordination within each jurisdiction, including industry engagement, security regulation and compliance arrangements, security exercising, and cross-jurisdictional coordination; • Train and exercise counter-terrorism plans and capabilities to maintain readiness, assess and review capability and identify improvements; • Support and coordinate critical infrastructure resilience in their jurisdictions; • Support the private sector, including owners and operators of crowded places, to protect their sites; • Develop, implement and maintain emergency management plans to respond appropriately to chemical, biological and radiological incidents; • Develop, implement and maintain emergency management plans to support responses to nuclear incidents prior to the provision of Australian Government and other specialist assistance when required; • Support health measures that are relevant to counter-terrorism preparedness; • Develop and deliver CVE activities to prevent, divert or rehabilitate individuals from violent extremism and address the social impacts of violent extremism within their jurisdictions; 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Coordinate the Australian Government response to terrorist incidents, both domestic and overseas; • Maintain national counter-terrorism related policies, legislation and plans; • Determine the national terrorism threat level and public narrative, in consultation with the states and territories; • Regulate aviation, maritime transport and offshore oil and gas sectors, administer relevant legislation and work with industry to ensure they meet their regulatory obligations and achieve security outcomes; • Work with state and territory, and local governments to develop a consistent and coordinated approach to securing the surface transport sector; • Support national coordination of critical infrastructure resilience; • Maintain the integrity of Australia's border; • Support national preparedness and response to Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear incidents; • Support national health measures that are relevant to counter-terrorism preparedness; • Maintain defence capabilities to assist with domestic terrorist incidents on request from states and territories; • Train and exercise counter-terrorism plans and capabilities to maintain readiness, assess and review capability and identify improvements; • Provide defence capabilities and effects when requested by states and territories, including across the disaster management continuum, PPRR model, as well as intelligence, training, exercising, international engagement and capacity building; • Provide oversight and coordination of nationally significant CVE projects to prevent, divert or rehabilitate individuals from violent extremism and efforts to address the social impacts of violent extremism, including support for best practice in CVE across all levels of government and lead on Australia's terrorist propaganda program; • Deliver CVE strategic communications to counter and contest the appeal of terrorist and violent extremist narratives and propaganda online;

- Deliver CVE strategic communications to support communities to withstand sudden shocks such as extremist violence or disasters;
- Strengthen social cohesion to counter violent extremism;
- Determine prevention strategies and operational responses through the Joint Counter Terrorism Team (JCTT) arrangements that provide a flexible and adaptive terrorism investigative resource and help ensure a coordinated and collaborative nationally consistent approach to combating terrorism of a multi-jurisdictional nature;
- Support the provision of protection to selected Australian high office holders, diplomats, foreign dignitaries and high profile visitors with the Australian Government;
- Have primary responsibility for the first response to a terrorist act in their jurisdiction;
- Seek assistance from, or provide assistance to, other jurisdictions as required;
- In the event of a terrorist act, consult and seek agreement with the Australian Government on the need to declare a National Terrorist Situation;
- Lead recovery efforts in their jurisdictions; and
- Maintain recovery coordination capabilities in the agencies listed in Annex A.

- Work with government and digital industry stakeholders to counter online terrorist and violent extremist exploitation of the internet, and uphold the principles of a free, open and secure internet;
- Determine Australian Government prevention strategies and operational responses to threats and preventative counter-terrorism investigations through the JCTT;
- Mitigate the threat posed by terrorist offenders released into the community after incarceration through the High Risk Terrorist Offender (HRTTO) regime;
- Lead the coordination and dissemination of relevant intelligence obtained by/from the National Intelligence Community (NIC) to state and territory partner agencies in order to combat terrorist threats;
- Coordinate the provision of protection to selected Australian high office holders, diplomats, foreign dignitaries and high profile visitors with state and territory jurisdictions;
- Provide the Australian government coordination of cyber security, including in relation to cyber security policy and incident response;
- In a National Terrorist Situation (NTS), undertake activities to support collaboration and coordination in close consultation with affected states and territories;
- Support national coordination of public information in relation to terrorism;
- Support the states and territories in their first response to a terrorist act within their jurisdictions;
- Provide support to Australians overseas impacted by a terrorist act;
- Provide financial and other support for recovery;
- Coordinate national consequence management activities following a terrorist incident where required;
- Manage the National Security Hotline and coordinate with relevant authorities; and
- Maintain counter-terrorism capabilities within the Australian Governments listed in Annex A.

Table 2 – Local Government, Private Sector and Community Roles

Local government, the private sector and the community, to varying levels, assist in Australia's prevention, preparedness, response and recovery efforts by:

Local Government and Private Sector Roles	Community Role
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Staying informed and being aware of the local context and obligations that fall to them under relevant Australian Government and state and territory governments and arrangements; • Recognising that they have primary responsibility for protecting their sites, including a duty of care to take steps to protect people that work, use or visit their site from a range of foreseeable threats, including the threat of a terrorist attack, and coordinating initial response activities at these sites; • Support communities to withstand sudden shocks such as extremist violence or disasters; • Raising awareness of potential terrorist threats among their staff and patrons; • Undertaking risk assessments and/or vulnerability analysis of their sites; • Implementing the appropriate mitigations, monitoring them for effectiveness (including through audits), and reviewing them at appropriate junctures; • Regularly testing security, emergency and contingency plans; • Participating in exercises to assist in harmonising prevention, response and recovery arrangements with relevant controlling agencies; • Sharing information with state and territory police and relevant government agencies; • Reporting any security incidents or suspicious activity to state and territory police at the earliest opportunity; and • Engaging with government agencies in regards to recovery efforts. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Staying informed and being aware of the current terrorist threat environment and arrangements through publicly available information; • Reporting any material found on the internet that is violent extremist in nature or could encourage radicalisation towards violence; • Being aware of their surroundings and reporting suspicious or unusual behaviour to authorities; • Monitoring public announcements during a terrorist act or threat to remain aware of what is required of them and what will assist in the management of the situation; and • Engaging with government agencies in regard to recovery efforts.

Figure 1 – Intergovernmental Agreements and Coordination Bodies relating to Counter-Terrorism




Figure 2 – Standing Australian Government and State and Territory Governments Coordination Bodies




Figure 3 – Australian Government and State and Territory Governments Coordination Bodies



Figure 4 National Counter-Terrorism Crisis Coordination Mechanisms

Figure 4: shows the relationship between state and territory coordination arrangements, agency-led coordination arrangements and whole-of-government coordination arrangements.

States and territories are the first responders to any incident that occurs within their jurisdiction.



Legal Framework

23. Australia has a comprehensive, cooperative and nationally coherent counter-terrorism legislative framework that enables Australia's police and law enforcement, intelligence and prosecution agencies to prevent terrorist acts occurring and investigate and prosecute those who commit acts of terrorism or who seek to commit such acts.¹
24. The Australian Government and state and territory governments are responsible for maintaining this framework and ensuring that it continues to be effective in responding to the evolving threat of terrorism.
25. The Inter-Governmental Agreement (IGA) on Counter-Terrorism Laws requires consultation to occur between the Australian Government and state and territory governments on amendments to relevant federal terrorism offences and on the proscription of terrorist organisations. The Australian Government must consult with, and obtain state and territory agreement to change aspects of the legislative framework.
26. State and territory legislation provides special powers to support law enforcement agencies' response to terrorist acts and suspected acts, and to seek to prevent suspected imminent terrorist acts within their jurisdictions.
27. At the forefront of the Commonwealth's legislative framework are the terrorism offences in the *Criminal Code Act 1995* (Cth) (the Criminal Code), which are targeted at individuals and organisations who engage in, train for, prepare, plan, finance or otherwise support terrorist activities. The Criminal Code also contains offences in relation to foreign incursions, which are targeted at foreign fighters and those who recruit foreign fighters.
28. Many of Australia's terrorism and foreign incursion offences target preparatory conduct, which allows law enforcement agencies to disrupt activities and arrest and charge persons at an earlier stage before lives are endangered.
29. The Criminal Code contains legislative provisions that allow for the making of preventative detention orders under which a person can be taken into custody and detained for a short period of time in order to prevent a terrorist act that is capable of being carried out, and could occur, within the next 14 days; or preserve evidence of, or relating to, a recent terrorist act.
30. The Criminal Code also contains legislative provisions that allow for the making of control orders, which protect the community by allowing conditions to be imposed on a person where it substantially helps prevent a terrorist attack, where the person has trained or participated in training with a listed terrorist organisation, engaged in a hostile activity of a foreign country, or been convicted of a terrorism offence.

¹ [Laws-to-combat-terrorism.aspx](https://www.dfat.gov.au/terrorism/laws-to-combat-terrorism.aspx)

31. The Criminal Code also contains legislative provisions that allow for the making of post-sentence orders in relation to individuals who have served a period of imprisonment for certain terrorism offences, but still pose an unacceptable risk of committing a serious terrorism offence.
32. The legislative framework contains appropriate safeguards and review processes to ensure there is a balance between national security requirements, the public interest, and civil and political rights, which require protection (e.g., personal privacy, presumption of innocence, due process rights).

PREVENTION

33. The Plan considers prevention from two perspectives by preventing:
- people or diverting people from becoming terrorists; and
 - terrorist attacks through intelligence-led disruption.
34. Prevention is undertaken through:
- countering violent extremism activities, including disengaging people from violent extremism, rehabilitating and reintegrating violent extremist offenders, preventing the exploitation of the internet by terrorists and violent extremists, and providing positive, alternative narratives to build the resilience of individuals vulnerable to extremist messaging;
 - the collection, analysis and dissemination of intelligence;
 - investigating the planning of, support for and facilitation of terrorist activity;
 - employing measures to protect the community and assets; and
 - influencing the international environment.

Countering Violent Extremism

35. CVE aims to reduce the risk of individuals becoming or remaining violent extremists and to address the social impacts of violent extremism. CVE activities are distinct from, but complement, counter-terrorism activities

such as investigations and operational responses.

36. The Australian Government and state and territory governments are all engaged in practical efforts to strengthen social cohesion, challenge violent extremist ideologies and prevent people from becoming terrorists. Australia's CVE efforts aim to:
- support the diversion of individuals at risk of becoming violent extremists;
 - build the awareness and resilience of communities to violent extremism;
 - rehabilitate and reintegrate violent extremists, including those who have returned to Australia from overseas conflict zones;
 - prevent the exploitation of the internet by terrorists and violent extremists;
 - provide positive, alternative narratives to build the resilience of individuals vulnerable to extremist messaging; and
 - support and invest in measures to strengthen social cohesion to mitigate the social impacts of violent extremism.

37. In support of these efforts, governments engage with communities, civil society organisations, digital industry, and international partners and with academia to ensure best practice approaches are



identified and, where appropriate, implemented.

38. Research underpins Australia's national CVE priorities and programs and is commissioned to inform our work relating to radicalisation, disengagement, risk assessment, best practice models and emerging threats.
39. The Australian Government provides, through funding, training and evaluation, holistic support for violent extremism risk assessment capability.
40. The Australian Government and state and territory governments work together to develop training and awareness-raising materials to educate and empower communities, families, youth, organisations and frontline professionals to more effectively recognise and respond to those vulnerable to violent extremism. These materials are developed in consultation with young people, and are therefore appropriately applied and effective.
41. The Australian Government and state and territory governments also work together to develop and implement programs to rehabilitate people imprisoned for terrorism related offences, as well as to prevent the radicalisation of other prisoners.

Living Safe Together Intervention Program (LSTIP)

42. The LSTIP is a national program framework designed to address all forms of violent extremism, including religiously and ideologically motivated violent extremism (<https://www.livingsafetogether.gov.au>).

43. Under the LSTIP framework, states and territories are responsible for the delivery of CVE interventions and work to refer, assess and support people who are vulnerable to violent extremism.
44. The LSTIP relies on a network of government and community partners to implement individualised, early intervention strategies, so that people can disengage from violence before they harm themselves or others.
45. The Australian Government provides national coordination, support and funding for the LSTIP framework.

CVE Safe and Together Community Grants

46. The CVE Safe and Together Community Grants Program is designed to help communities, including those in regional and rural Australia, identify the signs of radicalisation to violence, and know how to respond.
47. The Program works with community organisations to implement projects that:
 - increase community awareness of extremism;
 - empowers communities and families to engage with vulnerable young people; and
 - supports vulnerable individuals and their families who are successfully disengaging from extremist views and behaviours.

High Risk Rehabilitation and Reintegration (HRRR) Program

48. The Australian Government is working with states and territories to deliver high risk rehabilitation and reintegration services for high risk violent extremists in custody and in the community.
49. The HRRR Program is designed to support interventions for high risk violent extremists across a range of settings including:
 - convicted terrorist offenders who do not meet the requirements for the HRTTO regime;
 - offenders in prison or subject to community-based orders identified as violent extremists;
 - offenders remanded for terrorism offences;
 - foreign terrorist fighters returning from overseas, and
 - family members of foreign fighters, where appropriate.
50. The HRRR Program also aims to provide intensive, individualised CVE therapeutic interventions to support disengagement from violent extremism, rehabilitation and reintegration into the community. The HRRR Program is voluntary, however where assessed as appropriate, mandatory participation may be sought where there are appropriate legal mechanisms in place.
51. The Australian Government also supports the delivery of the Radicalisation and

Extremism Awareness Program (REAP), which trains frontline corrections officers to recognise and respond to radicalisation.

Preventing Exploitation of the Internet by Terrorists and Violent Extremists

52. The Australian Government reduces the risk of Australians being exposed to terrorist and violent extremist content online through government and digital industry engagement.
53. The Australian Government participates in multilateral fora, such as the Christchurch Call and the Global Internet Forum to Counter-Terrorism (GIFCT), to develop and promote global standards on how the digital industry must manage terrorist and violent extremist exploitation of their services.
54. Tabletop exercises with the Australian Government, state and territory law enforcement and digital industry stakeholders test and workshop existing legislative provisions and standard operating procedures for online crisis incident response.
55. Ongoing bilateral and multilateral engagement with digital industry aim to improve compliance with Australia's online harms legislation and encourage Safety by Design principles that protect Australians from terrorist and violent extremist content.
56. To reduce the risk of individuals being exposed to terrorist and violent extremist content online, the Australian Government refers terrorist and violent extremist content to digital platforms for consideration against their terms of service for removal.

57. The eSafety Commissioner (eSafety) also uses their independent statutory powers to remove or restrict certain terrorist and violent extremist content.
58. Other CVE initiatives in online communication include working with social media companies on taking down violent extremist material and abhorrent violent material, including through the Report Online Extremism tool for the public and increasing community capacity to undermine the appeal of violent extremism. Abhorrent violent material online may also be reported to eSafety for removal under Australia's Online Content Scheme.

Building Community Resilience and Social Cohesion

59. Building and sustaining social cohesion at the local level helps create a sense of shared purpose and belonging for all Australians.
60. Australian Government and state and territory governments, in partnership with communities, not-for-profit organisations, and business, are all engaged in practical efforts to strengthen social cohesion and resilience.
61. Australian Government activities include funding and conducting social policy programs that support community harmony and address barriers to social and economic participation, and support building connection and resilience. While these programs are not funded for security purposes improved social cohesion helps communities to withstand shocks and stresses such as acts of terrorism or disasters.

62. Effective partnership with communities, civil society organisations and other sectors of society, such as business, play a crucial role in the delivery and success of these initiatives.

Fixated Threat Assessment Centres

63. Operating in each jurisdiction, Fixated Threat Assessment Centres assess, manage and review fixated persons with a mental health illness who may pose a serious threat to dignitaries, have the potential for grievance-fuelled violence or are vulnerable to lone actor radicalisation.

Disrupting Terrorist Activity within Australia

Intelligence

64. Australia's approach to counter-terrorism relies upon a strong intelligence-led framework.
65. The National Security Hotline (1800 123 400) allows the private sector and the community to report possible terrorist activities to the appropriate authorities 24 hours a day, seven days a week.
66. Intelligence is collected and developed in many forms by agencies across the Australian national security community, including the agencies of the NIC and state and territory police. Relevant agencies use this intelligence to identify emerging threats and determine operational or policy responses.
67. The Threat Assessment Centre (TAC), located within ASIO, prepares assessments of the likelihood and possible nature of

terrorism and protest violence, including against Australia, Australians and Australian interests here and abroad, special events and international interests in Australia.

68. These assessments support jurisdictions and agencies to make risk management decisions to determine how best to respond to the threat and mitigate risk.
69. State and territory police and the AFP manage ongoing threat information at the tactical and operational level. Intelligence assessments are produced by state and territory police and the AFP to support and guide operational decision making.

Investigation

70. State and territory police and the AFP maintain investigative capabilities to detect and prevent terrorism related activity and to collect evidence that may be used in prosecutions for terrorism and terrorism-related offences.
71. The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Counter-Terrorism Cooperation and the JCTT provide and establish a nationally consistent governance framework for the strategic management of counter-terrorism investigations in jurisdictions.
72. JCTT are established in each state and territory and comprise AFP, state and territory law enforcement, ASIO and other government agencies. The JCTT provide a coordinated and consistent approach to combating terrorism.

73. JCTT conduct threat based preventative investigations, with a view to utilising a variety of measures to minimise threat and risk and/or bring criminal prosecutions for breaches of terrorism legislation. Comprehensive governance arrangements for the operation of JCTT are in place to ensure there is a coordinated response to terrorism within and across jurisdictions in accordance with the Plan.
74. Experience in Australia and overseas has shown the potential for those convicted of terrorism offences or former subjects of counter-terrorism investigation (Known Entities) to re-engage in violent extremist activity, including planning for or undertaking terrorist attacks. Some have undertaken attacks or attack planning years after a point-in-time assessment, which assessed that they did not pose a threat or were deemed to be of a lower threat level compared with other individuals, which security agencies were reviewing at that time.
75. The MoU on Information Sharing and Governance Arrangements regarding High-Risk Terrorist Offenders (HRTTO) provide and establish a nationally consistent governance framework to address the risk posed by those convicted of a Commonwealth terrorist offence upon their release into the community following incarceration.
76. The HRTTO arrangements include the AFP, AGD, state and territory law enforcement and corrections, ASIO and the Australian Government and state and territory governments to consider a suite of statutory

Prevention

Preparedness

Response

Recovery

options providing holistic risk mitigation through mandated rehabilitation, prohibitions, restrictions and obligations.

77. The National Known Entity Management (NKEM) framework provides a nationally consistent approach to identify indications of radicalisation or re-engagement by Known Entities, which are not subject of active counter-terrorism investigations that could indicate a trajectory towards violent extremist activity.
78. The NKEM framework supports operational priorities through the coordination of joint Australian Government agency capabilities to prevent, disrupt and prosecute the terrorism threat. NKEM framework partner agencies include state and territory police, Australian intelligence agencies, the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission (ACIC), Australian Border Force (ABF), the Australian Taxation Office, Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC) and the Department of Human Services.
79. Providing an additional specialist capability in support of counter-terrorism investigations, options available through the NKEM framework to mitigate the ongoing domestic threat include, preventing international travel through passport and visa cancellations, enhanced information exchange processes and access to relevant partner agency capabilities.

Arrest and Prosecution

80. A number of preparatory terrorism and foreign incursions offences exist in the Criminal Code that allow persons to be

arrested and prosecuted prior to committing terrorist acts in Australia or overseas. For more information on these offences, refer to 'What Australia is doing' and 'Laws to combat terrorism' on the National Security website <https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au>.

81. The Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (CDPP) is responsible for prosecuting a person for terrorism or terrorism related offences. Many of these offences require the Attorney-General's consent to prosecute. Arrangements exist between the CDPP and each of the state and territory Directors of Public Prosecutions to determine which Director should have carriage of matters when the matters involve offences against the laws of the Australian Government and state or territory.

Legislative Measures

82. Australia's Counter-Terrorism framework contains a number of legislative measures that seek to prevent terrorist acts occurring. They include control orders and preventative detention orders, and HRTO post-sentence orders. For more information on these measures, refer to the Criminal Code <https://www.legislation.gov.au/Series/C2004A04868> or <https://www.ag.gov.au/national-security/australias-counter-terrorism-laws>.
83. The HRTO regime applies to convicted terrorist offenders who continue to pose an unacceptable risk to the community if released at the end of their custodial sentence. A Continuing Detention Order (CDO) provides for the continued detention of an eligible offender who poses an

Prevention	Preparedness	Response	Recovery
<p>unacceptable risk of committing a serious terrorism offence, and a less restrictive measure would not be effective in managing this risk. An Extended Supervision Order (ESO) allows for the imposition of a range of conditions on an eligible offender, the purpose of which is to protect the community from an unacceptable risk of the offender committing a serious terrorism offence.</p> <p>84. The HRTTO regime Implementation Framework and other governance arrangements, such as the HRTTO MoU on Information Sharing, provide and establish a nationally consistent governance framework to facilitate the regime.</p> <p>Counter-Terrorism Financing</p> <p>85. As Australia's financial intelligence unit (FIU), AUSTRAC deploys financial intelligence capabilities to discover, understand and support multi-agency disruption efforts against terrorism financing. This includes production of proactive financial intelligence, as well as providing financial intelligence support to law enforcement counter-terrorism investigations through the AFP-led Joint Threat Financing Group (JTFFG) established by the AFP and AUSTRAC.</p> <p>86. AUSTRAC collaborates with a large network of international partners on terrorism financing and through international and regional bodies. Through the Financial Intelligence Consultative Group (FICG), AUSTRAC works with the FIUs of all Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member countries and New Zealand, to understand and disrupt terrorism financing in our immediate region. AUSTRAC also</p>		<p>contributes to global policy and standards in relation to counter-terrorism financing under the Financial Action Task Force and coordinates Australia's whole-of-government engagement with the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering. AUSTRAC also engages on counter-terrorism financing operational and strategic intelligence, trends and typology analysis through the Egmont Group, a global network of FIUs.</p> <p>87. AUSTRAC works jointly with financial sector, law enforcement and security intelligence partners, through the Fintel Alliance National Security Group, to harden the financial sector against terrorism financing and generate financial intelligence leads. AUSTRAC's regulatory and enforcement powers contribute to whole-of-government counter-terrorism disruption strategies.</p> <p>88. The Australian Government works to reduce the risks presented by Australian-based individuals in supporting terrorist activities through the illicit movement of currency out of Australia.</p> <p>89. The Australian Government imposes counter-terrorism financing sanctions under the <i>Charter of the United Nations Act 1945</i>, in accordance with Australia's obligations under UNSC Resolution 1373 (2001).</p> <p>90. The AFP maintains a JTFFG, through a Joint Agency Agreement with AUSTRAC, which works in support of the JCTT.</p> <p>Border Protection</p> <p>91. The Australian Government is responsible for Australia's customs, migration and border</p>	

Prevention	Preparedness	Response	Recovery
<p>protection activities that support national counter-terrorism prevention measures. The ABF is the lead agency responsible for protecting Australia's border and enabling legitimate travel and trade.</p> <p>92. In performing its role, the ABF enforces customs, migration and citizenship legislation to prevent the movement of violent extremists and goods used to support terrorist activities.</p> <p>93. The ABF plays a crucial role in maintaining the integrity of the migration and visa system, which enhances Australia's economic interest, and promotes a prosperous and cohesive society.</p> <p>Returning Australians of Counter-Terrorism Interest</p> <p>94. Australians who have fought or engaged with terrorist groups overseas and their families are carefully managed by law enforcement and security agencies alongside whole-of-government partners on a case-by-case basis.</p> <p>95. The Australian Government is responsible for the decision to repatriate Australian Citizens from foreign conflict zones.</p> <p>96. Agencies assess each potential returnee. This includes consideration of the threat they may pose, the potential criminality of their activities overseas, the level of their engagement with violent extremist groups and other security, diplomatic, humanitarian, community and welfare considerations.</p> <p>97. Depending on the circumstances, these persons could be temporarily excluded from</p>		<p>returning to Australia. If repatriated to Australia, these persons could:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • be prosecuted for criminal offences (including for providing material support to or associating with terrorist groups); • be subject to control orders or ongoing monitoring; • participate in diversion programs or other services to support reintegration, as appropriate; and/or • be offered a range of support services, including access to established programs, to support their reintegration. <p>98. Agencies carefully consider the circumstances of their families, including children, who want to return to Australia. Additional considerations are taken into account in relation to returning children who have been exposed to violent extremism.</p> <p>Dignitary and Foreign Mission Protection</p> <p>99. The multi-agency Security Coordination Group, chaired by the AFP coordinates the protection of Australian high office holders, foreign diplomatic and consular staff and premises, internationally protected persons and other international dignitaries. The AFP, in consultation with relevant agencies, determines a risk management strategy based on the threat assessment, the capabilities of protection providers and the interests of affected parties.</p> <p>100. The AFP and state and territory police share operational responsibility for the security of</p>	



Australian high office holders, diplomatic and consular officials, visiting dignitaries, internationally protected persons and other individuals assessed to be at risk.

Cyber Security

101. The Australian Government and state and territory governments work cooperatively with international partners, and with key industry partners to ensure Australia is well placed to prevent, deter and respond to cyber security threats. DFAT leads international engagement on cyber and critical technology issues, in coordination with the Department of Home Affairs (Home Affairs), the Department of Industry, Science and Resources (DISR), the Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC) and other agencies. The Coordinator for Cyber Security leads a National Office for Cyber Security.

Hazardous Material Security

102. The regulation of hazardous materials to prevent their use for terrorism purposes is a joint responsibility of the Australian Government and states and territories. There are specific Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) security arrangements and frameworks across jurisdictions informing and implementing these regulations.

Transport Security (Aviation, Maritime, Surface)

103. Under the IGA on Surface Transport Security, state and territory governments have specific responsibilities for ensuring jurisdictional legislation for surface transport

security is sufficiently strong to address terrorist threats and risks.

104. Home Affairs is the transport security regulator for the aviation and maritime transport industries and the offshore oil and gas sectors. Legislation relevant to regulation includes the *Aviation Transport Security Act 2004 (Cth)* (ATSA) and the *Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Act 2003* (MTOFSA). Home Affairs works with government partners and industry to maintain a strong, comprehensive and sustainable approach to transport security.
105. Home Affairs also works with state and territory local governments to develop a consistent and coordinated approach to securing the surface transport sector.
106. Australia works with other countries to comply with international transport security standards, which leads to improved transport security outcomes in Australia and abroad.

Aviation

107. The ATSA establishes a regulatory framework to safeguard against unlawful interference with civil aviation and maintain and improve aviation security.
108. The ATSA also establishes a regulatory framework for industry participants who may handle, prepare or transport air cargo at locations on airports or remotely from airports.
109. Security at Australian airports is the responsibility of the airport operator. For those airports declared to be a security

controlled airport under the ATSA, the operator is required to prepare a Transport Security Program (TSP). These declared airports must comply with their approved TSP and the ATSA and the Aviation Transport Security Regulations 2005 (ATSR). The ATSA makes provision for the issue of specific security directions by the responsible Australian Government Secretary (or their delegate) to address special circumstances or aviation security incidents.

110. The AFP maintains the Air Security Officer capability, which provides an in-flight response to prevent any acts which may interfere with the safe operation of an Australian Registered Aircraft or the safety of passengers and crew.

Maritime

111. The Australian Government has responsibility for offshore maritime counter-terrorism PPRR (that is seaward of the Territorial Sea Baseline).
112. State and territory governments have responsibility for on-shore maritime counter-terrorism PPRR (that is landward of the Territorial Sea Baseline) in their jurisdictions. State and territory governments are also responsible for Australia's terrorism response in ports and terminals.
113. If an act of terrorism occurs in the inshore maritime environment and the affected jurisdiction does not have capacity to respond, states and territories are to contact the Australian Maritime Border Operations Centre (AMBOC).

114. Enabled by the ABF and Australian Defence Force (ADF), Maritime Border Command (MBC) is the lead operational authority for coordinating Australia's whole-of-government response to and recovery from terrorist acts in the offshore maritime environment to the outer boundary of Australia's Security Forces Authority Area.

115. Responsibility for Counter-Terrorism prevention and response in relation to areas or facilities of national security significance that are landward of the Territorial Sea Baseline, with the exception of ports, may be subject to formal agreements between the Australian Government and the relevant jurisdiction.

116. The MTOFSA establishes a regulatory framework to safeguard against acts of unlawful interference in the maritime sector.

117. Home Affairs regulates the security arrangements of Australian ports, port facilities, ships and offshore oil and gas facilities through the MTOFSA.

Surface – Rail, Ferries, Bus

118. Surface transport security cooperation, particularly in prevention and preparedness, is guided by an IGA on Surface Transport Security under which the States and Territories have primary carriage of surface transport security issues. The agreement provides that States and Territories are to determine security identified surface transport operations. This action includes security risk assessment and security planning that takes into account the NTTAS.



119. The agreement provides that States and Territories are to determine security identified surface transport operations within their jurisdictions, assist in promoting protective security and Counter-Terrorism guidance materials to these operators, and generate opportunities for Counter-Terrorism exercising.

International arrangements for prevention

120. Australia's Ambassador for Counter-Terrorism leads Australia's international counter-terrorism engagement. This includes the negotiation of Counter-Terrorism partnerships, arrangements and agreements; harmonisation of Australia's capacity building activities; the provision of foreign policy advice related to the management of Australians of Counter-Terrorism interest offshore; and providing advice to the Minister for Foreign Affairs regarding the listing of persons and entities for counter-terrorism financial sanctions in accordance with Australia's international obligations.

121. The Counter-Terrorism Ambassador works with international partners to shape the global Counter-Terrorism environment, leverage Australia's CT engagement in support of its national interests more broadly, and advises domestic stakeholders on the international counter-terrorism landscape and international best practice.

122. DFAT and Home Affairs, in cooperation with Australian Government agencies, engage internationally on counter-terrorism, and

preventing and countering violent extremism to:

- shape regional and global approaches to counter-terrorism, and preventing and countering violent extremism through targeted engagement in priority multilateral and regional fora;
- build capacity of partner governments and communities to strengthen resilience to violent extremism;
- undermine the appeal of extremist thinking and messages; and
- learn from international experience to inform Australia's domestic counter-terrorism and preventing and countering violent extremism approaches.

123. To achieve these objectives, DFAT and Home Affairs collaborate with a range of international counterparts, both bilaterally and through mini lateral and multilateral fora, such as the United Nations, the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum (GCTF), and Likeminded Senior Officials Meeting on Counter-Terrorism, the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIL, Christchurch Call, the Aqaba Process and others.

124. Violent extremism disproportionately affects developing countries and undermines basic development goals. Australia's development assistance is partly guided by the *Development Approaches to Countering Violent Extremism: Policy Framework and Guidance Note*. The framework recognises that the drivers of violent extremism vary

across contexts and works to make preventing and countering violence extremism investments based on robust analysis, locally appropriate methods and measures to ensure they do no harm.

125. The NIC maintains overseas liaison channels to gather intelligence and to pursue investigations. The AFP also has members located at international posts that work to gather intelligence and engage on a police-to-police basis within the host countries. ASIO and the AFP also maintain a 24-hour monitoring and alert unit. Relevant Australian Government agencies provide the interface with overseas security, intelligence and police agencies as part of international counter-terrorism efforts.
126. Defence contributes to the whole-of-government efforts to prevent, prepare for, respond to and recover from terrorist activities by building military partner capacity, sharing intelligence with likeminded partners and where authorised, supporting the disruption of identified terrorist threats to Australia, Australians and our national interests.

PREPAREDNESS

127. Preparedness refers to the process of understanding the terrorist threat and communicating, planning, resourcing and exercising to ensure governments, agencies, the private sector and the community are best able to prevent, respond to, and recover from a terrorist act. Preparedness measures include the development, testing and review of counter-terrorism arrangements.

128. A key aspect of preparedness is the development and maintenance of the capabilities required by agencies and personnel. This includes the development of specialist skills through training, exercising and the acquisition of equipment.

129. Interoperability between agencies and jurisdictions is vitally important. Key to this is the development of complementary and coordinated plans and consistent capability development.

130. The private sector, the community and local organisations have critical roles in achieving appropriate levels of preparedness. Australian Governments and their responsible agencies will keep them informed and ensure they are effectively engaged.

National Terrorism Threat Advisory System and Public Advice

131. The National Terrorism Threat Advisory System (NTTAS) comprises: the National Terrorism Threat Level – a five tier scale; and an accompanying public statement (or

narrative), which provides further information such as the nature of the terrorist threat facing Australia and our interests.

132. The Director-General of ASIO sets the National Terrorism Threat Level on the basis of intelligence. The threat level is regularly reviewed and updated in-line with the security environment.



Figure 5 – National Terrorism Threat Level

133. Details regarding the NTTAS and the current National Terrorism Threat level are available at www.nationalsecurity.gov.au.

National Counter-Terrorism Capabilities and Preparedness

134. Australian Government, state and territory agencies maintain a variety of capabilities for counter-terrorism use.

135. The IGA on Australia's National Counter-Terrorism Arrangements aims to enhance Australia's counter-terrorism capability through a cooperative partnership between all jurisdictions.

136. The effectiveness of capabilities is tested through training and exercise programs, assessment of utility in operations, and by drawing on international experience and benchmarks.

137. The Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee (ANZCTC) provides strategic guidance, policy coordination and invests in nationally consistent approaches to

capability development with an emphasis on interoperability.

138. Interoperability activities include shared exercising and doctrine, consistent training, effective information sharing and procurement of specialised equipment and technology that may be otherwise unavailable to jurisdictional members.

Exercising and Training

139. Exercise activities are a key element of capability development and support continuous improvement through the maintenance, development and evaluation of counter-terrorism capabilities.

140. Agencies and jurisdictions undertake training activities designed to ensure that they have the capabilities required for preventative, response and recovery activities, including the investigation of terrorist acts. A key outcome of exercising and training is to ensure interoperability and cohesion across capabilities and jurisdictions.

141. Exercising provides the opportunity for multi-agency, cross sector engagement including:

- testing current plans and arrangements to identify capability gaps;
- validating and confirming levels of capability achievement;
- validating training and informing training requirements;
- developing and maintaining interoperability;

- informing the review and development of security legislation, policy, plans, arrangements and processes; and
- maintaining consistency in the application of national counter-terrorism arrangements.

142. Jurisdictions are responsible for the training and accreditation (where appropriate) of first responders and specialist policing capabilities according to their requirements.

143. As the lead whole-of-government coordinating authority for offshore maritime terrorist incidents (response and recovery), the Australian Government will conduct whole-of-government training and accreditation (where appropriate) to validate processes.

144. Training in relation to specialist police capabilities is undertaken in line with ANZCTC guidelines and jurisdictional requirements. All training programs and operational procedures are regularly reviewed and evaluated based on the best available evidence and feedback from relevant situations.

Public Information (including media liaison)

145. The Australian Government and state and territory governments ensure that public information and media liaison activities work to:

- improve the public's understanding of the terrorism threat and Australia's arrangements to counter that threat;
- generate confidence in Australia's ability to respond to any terrorist act, threat or activity;
- ensure consistent and coordinated messages are delivered in a timely manner; and
- ensure public information promotes community harmony and discourages all forms of hatred, vilification and violent extremism.

146. The Department of Home Affairs (Home Affairs) is responsible for coordinating Australian Government public information and media activity related to Australia's counter-terrorism effort, utilising messaging from the responsible agency, including first responder agencies in the states and territories. The Home Affairs Media and Communication Branch (MCB) is responsible for national coordination enabling the sharing of messaging between the Australian Government and state and territory agencies to support consistent messaging.

147. States and territories are responsible, within their jurisdictions, for public messaging in relation to their counter-terrorism responsibilities, including as first responders to a terrorist act.

148. The national approach to the sharing of public information, facilitated by Home Affairs, assists in providing consistent and coordinated public messaging across all facets of Australia's counter-terrorism effort.

Critical Infrastructure Protection and Resilience Arrangements

149. Australia has a number of frameworks in place to ensure the security of our critical infrastructure. This includes:

- *Security of Critical Infrastructure Act 2018* (Cth) (SOCI Act)
- *Telecommunications Act 1997* (Cth)
- ATSA; and
- MTOFSA.

150. SOCI Act aims to uplift security and risk management across 11 critical infrastructure sectors. This includes assets that are deemed to be critical to the defence or national security of Australia by the Minister for Home Affairs.

151. The SOCI Act provides a preventative and responsive framework to uplift security and resilience of critical infrastructure through obligations on critical infrastructure owners and operators including:

- A framework for Enhanced Cyber Security Obligations (ECSOs), which may be applied to operators of Systems of National Significance (SoNS) – Australia’s most important critical infrastructure assets. The ECSOs will support the resilience of SoNS to cyber threat activity.
 - Mandatory cyber incident reporting of certain cyber security incidents to the Australian Cyber Security Centre.
 - Provision of operational and ownership information to the Register of Critical Infrastructure Assets. This provides the Australian Government with a holistic view of ownership and operational information for that asset and interdependencies between assets.
 - Requirement to adopt and maintain a Critical Infrastructure Risk Management Program (CIRMP). The CIRMP requires responsible entities for specified critical infrastructure assets to consider and plan for risks across four key hazard domains: cyber and information, personnel, supply chain, physical and natural.
152. The SOCI Act also allows for the Australian Government to support industry in responding to serious cyber incidents.
153. The SOCI Act is supported by state and territory legislation, industry codes of practice and emergency management arrangements.
154. The Australian Government and state and territory governments work together with the private sector to maximise information sharing, increase the awareness of threats and hazards, and develop solutions to common security and resilience challenges.
155. State and territory police are responsible for disseminating relevant intelligence and threat information to appropriate sectors and owner and operators.
156. The 2023 Critical Infrastructure Resilience Strategy (the CIR Strategy) and Plan provides a national vision and approach for enhancing the security and resilience of Australian critical infrastructure in the face of all hazards. The CIR Strategy solidifies the Trusted Information Sharing Network (TISN) as the primary government-industry engagement vehicle to collaborate on critical infrastructure protection and the uplift of resilience. The accompanying Plan outlines national activities the Australian critical infrastructure community will pursue to realise the objectives of the CIR Strategy.
157. The TISN is an Australian Government initiative that is administered by Home Affairs. The TISN provides a secure online platform in which critical infrastructure owners and operators meet regularly to share information on security issues, including terrorism and extremism in relation to the protection of critical infrastructure.
158. Coordination and strategic guidance for the TISN is provided by the Critical Infrastructure

Advisory Council (CIAC), which comprises Australian Government, state and territory and industry representatives. Technical expertise is also contributed by the Resilience Expert Advisory Group (REAG).

159. The ANZCTC has produced publicly available documents on protecting critical infrastructure from terrorism, such as the *National Guidelines for Protecting Critical Infrastructure from Terrorism*.

Community/Private Sector Awareness and Partnerships

160. The private sector and the community can assist in Australia's prevention, preparedness, response and recovery efforts through staying informed and being aware of the national Counter-Terrorism arrangements through publicly available information such as in this Plan and on the national security website www.nationalsecurity.gov.au.
161. The National Security Hotline (1800 123 400) allows the private sector and the community to report possible terrorist activities to the appropriate authorities 24 hours a day, seven days a week.

Protecting Crowded Places

162. Australia's Strategy for Protecting Crowded Places from Terrorism (the Crowded Places Strategy) and its supporting guidelines provide owners and operators and other stakeholders, across the public and private sectors, with contemporary and consistent national guidance to help build and maintain the capacity to protect crowded places from terrorism.

163. The Crowded Places Strategy provides a structure for building a consistent national approach to protecting crowded places that can be applied flexibly throughout Australia.

164. The Crowded Places Sub Committee (CPSC) is a body that reports to and advises the ANZCTC on protecting crowded places from terrorism.

165. The CPSC works with, and is advised by, the Business Advisory Group (BAG). The BAG's membership consists of representatives of crowded places with a national presence. It operates a national forum through which crowded place owners and operators, peak industry bodies, government representatives, and international partners share information and advice. The BAG also enables drills and training for its members.

166. Information and guidance developed by the CPSC is shared, where appropriate, with owners and operators in all jurisdictions through the BAG and state and territory Crowded Places fora.

167. The ASIO Outreach Portal contains intelligence-backed reporting on the domestic and international security environment. To complement the website, the ASIO Outreach Branch engages directly with government and business stakeholders to build a common understanding and strong mutually beneficial relationships.

168. Additional information and supplementary guidelines associated with the Crowded Places Strategy, as well as advice for the

public about what to do in an attack, can be found at www.nationalsecurity.gov.au.

Science and Technology for National Security

169. The Defence Science and Technology Group's (DSTG) National Security Science and Technology Centre (NSSTC) coordinates' whole-of-government science and technology (S&T) for national security to prioritise requirements, reduce duplication and improve impact. To achieve this, the NSSTC fosters academic, industry and international partnerships to leverage state of the art capabilities for Australia.
170. In addition, the NSSTC manages the DSTG national security S&T program to focus the application of government, industry and academic S&T capabilities to deliver solutions to Defence and wider national security stakeholders.

International Preparedness Arrangements

171. DFAT is responsible for international engagement for the Australian Government supported by other Australian Government agencies who maintain an international presence or international links to facilitate cooperative activities, including intelligence sharing, collaboration and liaison.
172. DFAT promotes Australia's counter-terrorism interests through effective international advocacy, cooperation and capacity building. DFAT, in cooperation with Australian Government agencies, identifies and prioritises opportunities for strengthening

Australia's international counter-terrorism engagement. It also works with agencies on thematic or country specific issues.

173. The NIC and AFP have well established international networks and partnerships which are used to support domestic counter-terrorism arrangements.
174. Defence undertakes an extensive program of Counter-Terrorism engagement and capacity-building activities with international partners.
175. Home Affairs delivers capacity building activities to reduce the risk to Australia's interests.
176. The Australian Government has structures in place to make information available to Australians on security threats overseas. DFAT's Smartraveller maintains destination specific travel advisories to assist Australians to be prepared and make well-informed travel decisions to stay safe while overseas. The travel advisories contain information about safety and security risks, and other useful, practical tips on health, local laws, local customs and entry/exit requirements.
177. DFAT adheres to the 'no double standards' principle. There should be no difference in the information about risks provided to Australian travellers and government employees.
178. In accordance with the no-double-standards principle, if DFAT provides a directive to its staff in relation to safety and security within a

destination, then that directive must be reflected in the travel advice.

179. In addition, the government maintains contingency plans, which it may activate in response to an international incident affecting Australians overseas, including terrorist acts. Each of Australia's overseas posts maintain an all-hazards Crisis Action Plan, which is exercised annually, outlining how the post would respond to crisis in the post's countries of accreditation.
180. The Australian Government Response Plan for Overseas Mass Casualty Incidents (OSMASSCASPLAN), and the Australian Government Plan for the Reception of Australian Citizens and Approved Foreign Nationals Evacuated from Overseas (AUSRECEPLAN) is managed by NEMA. DFAT is the lead agency for these plans.

RESPONSE

181. Response refers to immediate actions taken to prevent or minimise loss of life, injury, damage to property and damage or disruption to infrastructure; facilitate investigations into the terrorist act, including the prosecution of offenders; and ensure that people affected by the threat or act are given immediate relief and support.
182. The ramifications of any terrorist act will necessitate high level decision-making within government. The scale or complexity of the act may also dictate special cooperative responses.

Domestic Context

Operational Arrangements

183. State and territory police and emergency response agencies have primary responsibility for responding to terrorist incidents within their jurisdictions, consistent with their statutory responsibilities and in accordance with arrangements established under the Handbook and state and territory plans. The Australian Government supports the affected state or territory as appropriate.
184. Australia's policy is, wherever possible and appropriate, to resolve terrorist situations through negotiation to minimise the risk to life. Australia will not make concessions in response to terrorist demands. Additional guidance in relation to negotiation policy is outlined in the Handbook.

185. While the preferred principle response strategy for the resolution of any high risk situation is to contain and negotiate, the nature of active armed offender and terrorist attacks may require consideration of an alternate response strategy to resolve these situations with the objective to prevent serious injury and/or death of person(s), including the rescue of hostages, by implementing appropriate resolution action as soon as practicable.
186. In a counter-terrorism response, police are responsible for resolving and investigating the circumstances of the act in accordance with arrangements established under the Handbook and state and territory police plans.
187. The Australian Government may also provide other operational support from other relevant agencies. Defence maintains capabilities to respond to domestic and international terrorist threats and attacks in support of Australian Government, and state and territory agencies.
188. All relevant information and evidence acquired in the course of the investigation is managed in accordance with agreed investigative arrangements. Other agencies involved maintain detailed records of events, decisions, plans and arrangements and provide these to police upon request.

Inter-Governmental Coordination

189. Each state and territory local government activates coordination arrangements in response to a terrorist act based on an assessment of the risk to that jurisdiction. This may include activating a State Crisis Centre (SCC) or /Territory Crisis Centre (TCC). The SCC/TCC provides support to its relevant Executive Government members and will be the primary communications link between the police command, the Australian Government and state and territory governments.
190. Affected jurisdictions may seek assistance from other jurisdictions and the Australian Government as specific responses require. The Australian Government may also seek assistance from jurisdictions as required.

Australian Government Role

191. After the National Situation Room (NSR) is notified of a terrorist act, it advises the Counter-Terrorism Coordination Centre (CTCC) and other relevant Australian Government agencies. The Australian Government Counter-Terrorism Coordinator is the lead senior official in response to a domestic terrorist act. If required, the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator will enliven Australian Government crisis coordination arrangements, which may include convening the Australian Government Crisis and Recovery Committee (AGCRC) and/or NCM as required.
192. The Governor-General may, on the advice of the Prime Minister, the Attorney-General and

the Minister for Defence, order the call out of the ADF under Part IIIAAA of the *Defence Act 1903* to assist civil authorities respond to incidents or threats involving widespread or significant violence, including a terrorist attack. This response framework – also known as Defence Force Aid to Civilian Authorities (DFACA) – can be used when the ADF would be likely to enhance the civilian authorities' response to a specific emergency. In sudden and extraordinary emergencies, a DFACA call out can be ordered on an expedited basis by the Prime Minister alone, or jointly by the Attorney-General and Minister for Defence if the Prime Minister is unable to be contacted.

193. ASIO and the AFP establish appropriate mechanisms involving relevant agencies to assess and disseminate intelligence and information relevant to the terrorist act.
194. In the first instance, management of needs and resources is coordinated between Home Affairs and state and territory authorities according to existing plans. Home Affairs coordinates Australian Government assistance.
195. In the event of an offshore maritime terrorist act, the MBC will coordinate Australia's whole-of-government response to, and recovery from, the incident and will work with the state or territory law enforcement agency directly affected to resolve the matter.

National Terrorist Situation

196. In the event of a terrorist incident, the Australian Government and the directly affected state and/or territory may agree the incident constitutes a National Terrorist Situation (NTS), reflecting a shared understanding of the benefits of national coordination.

197. A NTS could be considered when a terrorist incident(s) impacts Australian Government interests or has national implications and requires broad policy and strategy coordination by the Australian Government.

198. Following consultation with the First Minister(s) of the directly affected jurisdiction(s), the Prime Minister and the First Minister(s) may agree the terrorist incident constitutes a NTS.

199. The public may be advised of the agreement between the Prime Minister and the First Minister(s) of the directly affected jurisdiction(s) that a terrorist incident is a NTS. However, this would be a matter for consideration by the Australian Government and the affected jurisdiction(s).

200. In the event of a terrorist incident, crisis management arrangements are activated, including the NCM which will meet to make recommendations for consideration by the Prime Minister and First Minister(s) of the directly affected jurisdiction(s).

201. This process does not preclude the Prime Minister and the directly affected First Minister(s) agreeing a terrorist incident

constitutes a NTS outside of these arrangements. This agreement will be formally documented.

202. Factors that could inform the assessment of whether a terrorist incident constitutes a NTS may include:

- the attack being planned or directed at Australian Government targets of having national implications;
- involvement of multiple jurisdictions;
- impact of a threat involving civil aviation (including a Major Aviation Security Incident involving a threat to an aircraft in-flight), telecommunications, maritime interest or cargo security;
- scale and nature of the incident, including the use or intended use of CBRN materials;
- involvement of nationally vital infrastructure;
- significance of the threat; and/or
- involvement of foreign or international interests.

203. In a NTS, the Australian Government may provide leadership in areas such as:

- National leadership on strategic issues;
- Policy settings beyond the authority or scope of the affected jurisdiction (e.g. aviation security settings at designated airports);

- Australian Government agency support; and/or
- Communication (e.g. international engagement/liaison).

204. In circumstances where a NTS determination has not been made, the Australian Government may still provide support to states and territories in these areas.

205. Additional NTS guidance is outlined in the Handbook.

Public Information (including media liaison)

206. The responsible agency (usually state and territory police in accordance with jurisdictional arrangements) leads public messaging on the operational response to a terrorist act.

207. Home Affairs MCB acts as a central hub for sharing public information with States and Territories and other relevant Australian Government agencies during a terrorist act or a period of heightened terrorist threat.

208. Home Affairs MCB is not responsible for clearing agency or jurisdiction information, but ensuring the information is shared with states and territories and disseminated through established communication channels.

209. Home Affairs MCB also leads messaging in response to a terrorism incident in line with the AGCMF and coordinates national security public information and media responses at a Australian Government level,

where a coordinated whole-of- government approach is required.

210. The Australian Government and state and territory governments are responsible for maintaining effective communication channels within their jurisdiction to enable prompt distribution of key messages and material, including to maintain community harmony.

211. The police are responsible for liaising with the media according to their standing arrangements, in consultation with the affected agencies or organisations. Public information, including media statements, will be coordinated between states and territories and the Australian Government, in a terrorist incident, or suspected terrorist incident through arrangements facilitated by Home Affairs and in line with state and territory arrangements.

212. All public information and media liaison activities are conducted in line with the National Security Public Information Guidelines (NSPIG), which provides specific advice for government agencies. The NSPIG is not publicly available.

Online Content Incident Arrangement

213. The Online Content Incident Arrangement (OCIA) is Australia's domestic crisis response protocol aimed at stopping the viral spread of online terrorist and extreme violent content related to an Online Crisis Event, such as a terrorist incident involving an online element (e.g. a livestream).

214. The OCIA is a voluntary, principles-based framework designed to enhance communication flows and information sharing between government and industry stakeholders during a potential Online Crisis Event.

215. The arrangement outlines the steps to be taken once an online incident is identified that involves terrorist or extreme violent material that is widely accessible to Australians online. OCIA participants include Australian Government agencies and digital industry.

Hazardous Material Incidents

216. The state and territory governments have responsibility for the development, implementation and maintenance of disaster/emergency management plans that include capabilities to prevent, prepare, respond and recover from chemical, biological and radiological incidents and conduct subsequent investigations.

217. State and territory local governments have the responsibility to develop, implement and maintain emergency management plans to support responses to nuclear incidents, prior to the provision of Australian Government and other specialist assistance when required.

218. The response to a terrorist incident involving CBRN will be supplemented by specialist expertise from state, territory and Australian Government agencies.

219. Defence may be deployed to assess and respond to CBRN incidents when requested.

International Arrangements for Response

Australian Government Coordination

220. Following a terrorist act overseas affecting Australians or Australia's interests, the Head of Mission (HoM), or delegated authority, of the relevant Australian Embassy, High Commission or Consulate-General (the post) will advise the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Secretary of DFAT and the Global Watch Office of the terrorist act. In many cases this will trigger the convening of the Inter-Departmental Emergency Task Force (IDETF) that will coordinate the government's response to the act.

221. The DFAT Crisis Centre may be activated in the event of a major international terrorist act. The DFAT Crisis Centre manages a crisis from policy, security, consular, humanitarian, public information and other operational perspectives. It supports the IDETF coordination and management of a whole-of-government response to an international crisis.

222. The DFAT Crisis Centre accommodates liaison officers from other agencies, including the ABF, the AFP, Defence, Home Affairs, and intelligence agencies that can provide a direct response to the IDETF on agency-specific information. For lower scale incidents involving Australians, these functions will be carried out by the Global Watch Office (GWO).

223. The AFP is the lead operational agency on the investigation of Australians kidnapped

offshore, where there is a nexus to terrorism. Management and response to Kidnap for Ransom (KFR) is coordinated through the IDETF. The AFP provides appropriate specialist support to the IDETF to contribute to the whole-of-government response.

Head of Mission

224. The HoM, or delegated authority, will lead the Australian Government response in a country of accreditation, including the provision of consular support to affected Australians and their immediate family members, and provide updates to support IDETF decision making.
225. Other Australian agencies, with direct links to the host government, can input information gained through their liaison efforts through the post's situation report or report directly through the IDETF.
226. The AFP international network will engage with its international law enforcement partners, in support of the HoM, and provide information into the post's situation report.

Sending Personnel Overseas

227. The dispatch overseas of a Crisis Response Team (CRT) and the deployment of ADF, medical, police or other personnel will generally be considered by the IDETF, prior to any approval being granted. Offshore Australian assistance, beyond CRT deployments, is facilitated under AUSASSISTPLAN.
228. The legal basis for sending any team overseas is assessed, negotiated and

approved on a case-by-case basis. DFAT (in consultation with Home Affairs and NEMA where appropriate), will consider the legal basis for their deployment, as well as the composition of each team. Australia's response to a terrorist act overseas will take into account Australia's obligations under international law.

International Intelligence Coordination

229. During an incident overseas involving Australians or Australian interests, intelligence arrangements will continue to operate as normal.
230. In the event of an overseas terrorist act, ASIO will coordinate a whole-of-government intelligence response through regular reporting by the National Threat Assessment Centre (NTAC).

Police to Police and Law Enforcement Engagement

231. During an act overseas involving Australians or Australian interests, the AFP will liaise with law enforcement partners to maintain police-to-police cooperation as normal, and in support of the HoM or delegated authority. Consideration will be given to providing police-to-police support if requested.
232. In the event of an overseas terrorist act, the AFP will engage directly with host foreign law enforcement counterparts to offer police-to-police assistance if required and in the interests of Australia.

Australian Government Evacuations

233. If the safety of Australians, or approved foreign nationals overseas is threatened as a result of a crisis, this could include an act of terror, the Australian government may decide to conduct a non-combat evacuation or repatriation.

234. The Australian Government evacuations are facilitated under AUSASSISTPLAN, AUSRECEPLAN and OSMASSCASPLAN for injured and deceased Australians and approved foreign nationals.

235. The methods used for evacuation will necessarily vary according to the situation, and the resources at the disposal of the Australian Government.

States and Territories Assistance

236. In the event of an international terrorist act or critical incident overseas, states and territories may be involved in reception arrangements, including the provision of medical or other assistance to affected individuals. The reception of affected individuals is managed under AUSRECEPLAN.

237. An overseas terrorist act or critical incident may require states and territories to assist through the provision of specialist assistance including medical, police and/or forensic assistance. The AFP would lead any policing response to an international incident with support as required from state and territory police.

238. The dispatch of state or territory assistance overseas would be part of a whole-of-government response on the recommendation of DFAT. NEMA has primary carriage for requesting and coordinating such input from the States and Territories on behalf of DFAT under the AUSASSISTPLAN.

International Partnerships

239. In the event of a deliberate release of hazardous substances, such as a biological or chemical agent or radiological material affecting public health, the World Health Organization (WHO) global alert and response framework, together with the technical resources of the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN) would form part of effective international containment efforts. Australia is an active participant in GOARN. The deployment of Australian experts to assist in an offshore crisis is facilitated under the AUSASSISTPLAN following a request from the affected nation and as part of an international crisis led by DFAT.

Public Information - International

240. The IDETF has overall responsibility for media management following a major overseas incident. The IDETF will direct the DFAT Crisis Centre's schedule for the production of updates and the dissemination of talking points for use by all relevant agencies, posts and ministers. DFAT may provide a media representative to coordinate other agencies' media representatives and to work in close consultation with state and

territory media agencies. For lower scale incidents involving Australians, the GWO and DFAT's Media Liaison section will coordinate media responses.

241. In response to any international incident involving Australians, DFAT would utilise the Crisis Hub, a consolidated digital information portal on the DFAT website, which provides details on consular and humanitarian crisis response. The Crisis Hub provides integrated key crisis-related information to the Australian public for major international incidents, including consular, humanitarian and security crises.

242. Specific and credible threat information held by the Australian Government is conveyed to the Australian public via DFAT Smartraveller travel advisories. All travel advisories are kept under close review and updated if there are significant risks to Australians.

RECOVERY

243. Recovery is the coordinated process of supporting affected communities in reconstruction of the physical infrastructure and restoration of psychological, social, economic, environmental and physical wellbeing in the aftermath of a terrorist act.
244. All state, territory and governments undertake recovery activities in keeping with their state and territory emergency management legislation.
245. The Australian Disaster Recovery Framework outlines the principles and arrangements for coordinating recovery for disaster-impacted communities.
246. The *Australian Emergency Management Arrangements* handbook also articulates the core principles that underpin and guide emergency management activities, including in recovery.
247. The Australian Government will work collaboratively with affected individuals, groups, communities and the private sector to re-establish essential services, and restore public confidence and community wellbeing. As with all emergencies, the size and scale of the event will dictate the level of government involvement, including the support activated under the Disaster Recovery Funding Arrangements (DRFA).

All Hazards Crisis Management Arrangements

248. State and territory emergency management arrangements generally cover all hazards, including terrorism. These arrangements include the roles and responsibilities of agencies that support recovery.
249. Where a disaster event is declared that meets certain thresholds, a range of recovery support can be co-funded between the Australia Government and state and territory governments through the DRFA.

Domestic Context

Transitional Arrangements from Response to Relief and Recovery

250. State and territory governments are responsible for coordinating recovery from a terrorist act affecting their jurisdiction. Relief and recovery activities will begin alongside the initial response to a terrorist act.
251. As the response to the terrorist act winds down, arrangements are put in place to transition to the recovery phase. This includes arrangements for media, information management, impact and needs assessment, case management, rehabilitation of built and natural environments, and restoring social networks and public confidence. The Australian Government supports the states and territories governments to fulfil this role.

Operational and Coordination Arrangements

State and Territory Role

252. Existing state and territory government arrangements for emergency relief and recovery coordination may be activated following a terrorist act (the DRFA).

253. State and territory government arrangements specify which agencies are responsible for recovery services and incorporate local, regional and state level coordination.

254. The generic role of state and territory governments includes:

- coordinating and facilitating the whole-of-government recovery process;
- developing policy on recovery management planning and operations;
- developing the recovery strategy;
- overseeing the implementation of the recovery strategy;
- providing advice to government; and
- regularly reviewing recovery plans and arrangements.

255. Regional/district/local committees coordinate recovery services on a regional, district or local basis. The generic role of regional, district or local recovery committees include:

- coordinating and facilitating a whole-of-agency recovery process;

- implementing regional/district/local aspects of the recovery strategy;
- developing and implementing regional/district/local policy on recovery management planning and operations;
- providing advice to government;
- coordinating post disaster recovery reports; and
- regularly reviewing recovery plans.

256. A variety of non-government organisations also provide recovery services, which may be coordinated through local authorities and state and territory committees.

Australian Government Role

257. The Australian Government may support the states and territories to fulfil their role in coordinating recovery and funding recovery support. The Australian Government, in close consultation with affected states and territories, may consider the initial recovery strategy and government resources that could support its implementation. Where necessary, the Australian Government will support national coordination of recovery efforts.

258. In accordance with the AGCMF, Home Affairs and NEMA are the Australian Government co-leads for the recovery from a terrorist incident.

259. The AGCRC is chaired by NEMA and may be co-chaired by PM&C, or the Counter-

Terrorism Coordinator responsible for the planning and coordination of the Australian Government support for disaster recovery activities following an onshore or offshore disaster of national significance.

260. The AGCRC recommends to the Australian Government the provision of tailored recovery assistance in response to disasters of national significance, and in the coordination of assistance to Australians in the event of an off-shore disaster or critical incident related to terrorism. The AGCRC will base any advice to the government on information provided by the states and territories about recovery needs.

261. The IDETF is chaired by DFAT and may be co-chaired by PM&C. The IDETF manages the whole-of-government response, including humanitarian and consular assistance, to overseas incidents of crises that impact Australians or Australia's interests.

Public Messaging

262. The affected state or territory leads public messaging on the recovery efforts following a terrorist act. Information will include details about the situation, what agencies are doing and what recovery services are available. The national approach to the sharing of public information, facilitated by Home Affairs, also applies to the recovery phase.
263. Media and public information issues in the recovery phase will continue to be coordinated in accordance with the NSPIG.

264. State and territory police are responsible for providing information to the public about those killed, injured or missing following a terrorist act. They may be supported by a database of information about victims, such as that maintained by the Australian Red Cross. Jurisdictions may also have additional systems that will be used in conjunction with this register.

Financial Assistance and Economic Recovery

265. All states and territories can provide emergency grants and personal hardship payments, which are generally focused on covering short-term expenses such as essential personal items and emergency accommodation. These payments are generally enacted at the discretion of a designated Minister in each jurisdiction and may be provided as a grant or in kind.
266. The Australian Government can provide financial assistance to states and territories, individuals and organisations (including small businesses, primary producers and non-profit organisations) following a terrorist act, including to co-fund the support outlined above, under DRFA.
267. Under these arrangements, the state or territory government determines which areas receive DRFA assistance and what assistance is available to individuals and communities. The DRFA may be made available following an onshore terrorist act.

268. More information on the DRFA and its application to a terrorist act is available at <http://www.disasterassist.gov.au>.

269. The Australian Government Disaster Recovery Payment (AGDRP) and the Disaster Recovery Allowance (DRA) allows for the provision of financial assistance to individuals that have been impacted by a disaster.

270. AGDRP can be activated when the impact of a disaster on individuals and families requires the Australian Government assistance, in addition to that provided under other arrangements.

271. The DRA is a short-term income support payment to assist individuals who can demonstrate their income has been affected as a direct result of a disaster. When available, DRA assists employees, sole traders and farmers who experience a loss of income as a direct result of a disaster event.

272. The Australian Reinsurance Pool Corporation (ARPC) is a corporate Australian Government entity established by the *Terrorism and Cyclone Insurance Act 2003* (TI Act) to administer the terrorism reinsurance scheme.

273. The scheme provides primary insurers with reinsurance for commercial property and associated business interruption losses arising from a declared terrorist act. A declared terrorism act under the TI Act requires insurers of eligible commercial property to cover terrorism losses for

property damage, business interruption and public liability within their commercial insurance policies.

International Arrangements for Recovery

Victim and Family Assistance

274. In support of the AFP counter-terrorism offshore capability, the AFP has a Family Investigative Liaison Officer (FILO) capability, which allows the AFP to engage effectively with Australian victims of overseas terrorist acts and their families in times of crisis. The AFP FILO may assist in the collection of ante-mortem material to assist in the identification of deceased or missing Australians or those persons of interest to Australia and assist in the management of victims and families through any resulting investigations and court processes. AFP Liaison Officers within the AFP International Network may also assist in victim and family investigative assistance while offshore.

275. DFAT provides consular assistance to Australians impacted by an overseas crisis and assistance to their family members in Australia in line with the Consular Services Charter.

Identification and Repatriation of Remains

276. The AFP has responsibility to lead and coordinate the identification of Australian victims of overseas mass casualty incidents under frameworks enabled under the Australia New Zealand Policing Advisory Agency (ANZPAA) Disaster Victim

Identification (DVI) Committee (ADVIC). This is subject to an offer to assist which is made to the country concerned.

277. The AFP works to global DVI standards, approved by the INTERPOL DVI working group and adopted by ADVIC. Where the AFP is assisting another jurisdiction, the AFP will ensure that the INTERPOL standards are followed.

278. DFAT provides guidance on the methods for repatriation of remains of Australians during, and in the aftermath of, an incident abroad. While following INTERPOL guidelines is encouraged, the repatriation of remains from other countries may vary as DVI processes may differ from country to country.

279. Where a foreign national is killed as a result of an incident occurring in Australia, the authority which is registering the death, whether it be police, a coroner or other authority, should inform the relevant foreign embassy, high commission, or consulate of the death without delay.

Financial Assistance Payments for Terrorist Events Overseas

280. The Australian Government Victims of Terrorism Overseas Payment (AVTOP) scheme, managed through Services Australia, allows for the provision of financial assistance to victims of a declared terrorist act overseas who were Australian citizens and residents at the time of the terrorist act.

281. Australians harmed and the close family members of an Australian person who dies as a direct result of a declared terrorist act overseas may be eligible for payments up to a designated amount.

GOVERNANCE AND REVIEW

282. Australia's national counter-terrorism coordinating body, the ANZCTC, meets regularly to monitor and assess the effectiveness of counter-terrorism arrangements. The ANZCTC reports biannually to the First Secretaries Group (FSG).

283. This Plan will be reviewed on a regular basis by the ANZCTC to ensure it reflects current governance and operational responsibilities in: preventing, preparing for, responding to, and recovering from terrorist acts in Australia and its territories.

284. The ANZCTC will be responsible for approving updated versions of the Plan as required.

GLOSSARY

ABF	Australian Border Force	AUSTRAC	Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre
ACIC	Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission	AVTOP	Australian Victims of Terrorism Overseas Payment
ACSC	Australian Cyber Security Centre	BAG	Business Advisory Group
ADF	Australian Defence Force	CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
AFP	Australian Federal Police	CTCC	Counter-Terrorism Coordination Centre
AGCRC	Australian Government Crisis Recovery Committee	CDPP	Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions
AGDRP	Australian Government Disaster Recovery Payment	CERT	Computer Emergency Response Team
AGD	Attorney-General's Department	CI	Critical Infrastructure
AGO	Australian Geospatial Intelligence Organisation	CIAC	Critical Infrastructure Advisory Council
HMM	Health Ministers Meeting	CIRMP	Critical Infrastructure Risk Management Program
ANSTO	Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation	CPSC	Crowded Places Sub Committee
ANZCTC	Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee	CRT	Crisis Response Team
ANZPAA	Australia New Zealand Policing Advisory Agency	CVE	Countering Violent Extremism
ARPANSA	Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency	DIO	Defence Intelligence Organisation
ASD	Australian Signals Directorate	DFAT	Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
ASIO	Australian Security Intelligence Organisation	DISR	Department of Industry, Science and Resources
ASNO	Australian Safeguards and Non-proliferation Office	DITRDCA	Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications and the Arts
ATSA	<i>Aviation Transport Security Act 2004 (Cth)</i>	DRA	Disaster Recovery Allowance
ATSR	<i>Aviation Transport Security Regulations 2005 (Cth)</i>	DSCNS	Deputy Secretaries Committee on National Security
		DSTG	Defence Science and Technology Group

DVI	Disaster Victim Identification	NIC	National Intelligence Community
ECSO	Enhanced Cyber Security Obligations	NICC	National Intelligence Coordination Committee
FSG	First Secretaries Group	NKEM	National Known Entity Management
FILO	Family Investigative Liaison Officer	NSC	National Security Committee of Cabinet
GCTF	Global Counter-Terrorism Forum	NSPIG	National Security Public Information Guidelines
GOARN	Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network	NSR	National Situation Room
GWO	Global Watch Office	NSSTC	National Security Science and Technology Centre
Health	Department of Health and Aged Care	NTS	National Terrorist Situation
Home Affairs	Department of Home Affairs	OCIA	Online Content Incident Arrangement
HoM	Head of Mission	PM&C	Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet
HRTTO	High Risk Terrorist Offender	PPRR	Prevention, Preparedness, Response and Recovery
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency	REAG	Resilience Expert Advisory Group
IDETF	Inter-Departmental Emergency Task Force	SCC	State Crisis Centre
IGA	Inter-Governmental Agreement	SCNS	Secretaries Committee on National Security
JCTT	Joint Counter-Terrorism Teams	SOCI Act	<i>Security of Critical Infrastructure Act 2018</i>
JIG	Joint Intelligence Group	SOER	Special Operations Engineer Regiment
KFR	Kidnap for Ransom	SoNS	Systems of National Significance
MBC	Maritime Border Command	TAC	Threat Assessment Centre
MCB	Media Communications Branch	TCC	Territory Crisis Centre
MTOFSA	<i>Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Act 2003</i>	The Plan	National Counter-Terrorism Plan
NCM	National Coordination Mechanism	TISN	Trusted Information Sharing Network
NDRAA	Natural Disaster Relief and Recovery Arrangements		
NEMA	National Emergency Management Agency		

TSP Transport Security Program

WHO World Health Organization

ANNEX A

Agency Roles

States and Territories

A range of agencies develop and deliver CVE activities to prevent, divert or rehabilitate individuals from violent extremism and address the social impacts of violent extremism within their jurisdictions.

Dangerous goods and work cover agencies maintain standards for the security and transport of dangerous substances.

Emergency services provide consequence management in the event of a terrorist act, consistent with state and territory plans and structures.

Engineering services/public works departments assist the recovery of physical infrastructure.

First ministers' departments coordinate whole-of-government preparedness and response.

Health departments participate in the development and maintenance of biological hazard plans; provide hospital treatment and on-going care for victims. Assist in the intervention and diversion of fixated individuals through the joint agency program, of the Fixated Threat Assessment Centres with police agencies.

Police have operational responsibility for preparing for, preventing and responding to terrorism and will investigate possible terrorist activity.

Recovery agencies (which may include Community Services, Justice, Health or First ministers' departments) assist individual and community recovery through the coordinated provision of emergency and ongoing assistance.

Transport departments are responsible for coordinating surface transport operations and ensuring the implementation of security arrangements for those operations that are security identified.

Australian Government

AirServices Australia provides air traffic management covering 11 percent of the world's airspace, air navigation infrastructure services and aviation rescue and firefighting services at 27 airports.

ANSTO is a Publicly Funded Research Agency with responsibilities under the *Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation Act 1987* (Cth). ANSTO can assist in the prevention, preparedness, detection, response and recovery of a radiological/nuclear incident by providing scientific expert advice, technical assistance, and make available on-site resources and facilities in areas such as radiation and nuclear safety, nuclear security, emergency response and forensics. ANSTO's capabilities can be accessed through prior arrangement, such as a MoU, with ANSTO.

Attorney-General's Department administers, and has policy responsibility for, the *Criminal Code Act 1995* and the *Crimes Act 1914*, and provides legislative and policy advice on the provisions that relate to Australia's terrorism offences. Certain offences cannot be prosecuted without the consent of the Attorney-General.

As the AFP Minister, the Attorney-General is the applicant under the HRTTO regime and the decision-maker regarding terrorist organisations listings under the Criminal Code. The Attorney-General is also one of the three authorising Ministers for Defence Force Aid to Civilian Authorities (DFACA) responses under Part IIIAAA of the *Defence Act 1903*.

AUSTRAC is Australia's anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing regulator and financial intelligence unit, responsible for detecting, deterring and disrupting criminal abuse of the Australian financial system, to protect the Australian community from serious and organised crime.

Australian Border Force, is an operationally independent body within the Home Affairs portfolio. The ABF's role in border protection involves facilitating traveller and cargo clearance while preventing the cross-border movements of illicit goods and individuals who represent a threat. The ABF helps identify, target and disrupt high-level criminal activity associated with the unlawful movement and exploitation of people.

Maritime Border Command is a multi-agency taskforce within the ABF responsible for civil law enforcement in the Australian Maritime Domain. MBC combines the resources and expertise of the ABF and the ADF to deliver a coordinated approach to Australia's offshore civil maritime security. MBC is the lead for coordinating Australia's whole-of-government response to, and recovery from, a terrorist act in the offshore maritime environment to the outer boundary of Australia's Security Forces Authority Area and may also be called upon by a state or territory to assist in the event of a maritime terrorist incident landward of the territorial Sea Baseline.

Australian Federal Police enforces Commonwealth criminal law and protects Australian Government and national interests from crime in Australia and overseas. The AFP is the Australian Government's primary law enforcement body and provides services to assist in the prevention and investigation of crime in relation to Australian interests both in Australia and overseas.

The AFP International Network conducts enquiries on behalf of all Australian state, territory and Australian Government law enforcement agencies, including on terrorism matters. The AFP collaborates with international law enforcement agencies to drive investigations and support cooperation, gathers and exchanges criminal intelligence, and enhances the capacity and the capability of international law enforcement agencies to combat transnational crime.

In disrupting terrorist activity, the AFP hosts JCTT involving state and territory police and law enforcement partners, which conduct preventative investigations to minimise threat and risk and/or bring criminal prosecutions for breaches of terrorism legislation.

The AFP also leads the NKEM framework coordinating joint Australian Government agency capabilities to prevent, disrupt and prosecute the terrorism threat. This provides an additional specialist capability in support of counter-terrorism investigations by providing a link into some of these non-traditional partner agencies.

The AFP maintains a Joint Threat Financing Group (JTTF) which works in support of the JCTT. The JTTF is a multi-disciplinary unit which

works closely with various law enforcement agencies, intelligence partners and other government departments in partnership with AUSTRAC through a Joint Agency Agreement. The establishment of the JTTF reflects the central role that financing plays in all counter-terrorism investigations and demonstrates the collegiate approach to countering terrorism financing adopted in Australia.

In addition, the AFP has responsibility for providing community policing services in the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) in accordance with the Policing Arrangement and Purchase Agreement between the ACT Government and the Australian Government. In this context, the AFP has the primary responsibility for preventative investigations in the ACT, and overseeing the Diversion program (LSTIP) in the ACT with relevant agencies. Diversion programs are one part of the nationwide effort, combining law enforcement, the Australian Government and state and territory governments, and communities, to address all forms of radicalisation to violent extremism.

The national Diversion program is called the Living Safe Together Intervention Program (LSTIP) and is funded by Home Affairs to operate in all states and territories. In the ACT, the LSTIP is coordinated by ACT Justice and Community Safety Directorate and case management is undertaken by the ACT Policing Education and Diversion Team.

Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency is the International Atomic Energy Agency's designated National Competent Authority for Emergency Preparedness. ARPANSA's role in a radiation emergency response focuses on radiation emergency medical preparedness, health physics response, environmental monitoring, and nuclear safety and risk assessments. Providing specialist technical operational support teams to the Australian Government and the states and territories upon request, ARPANSA's experts are capable of locating, identifying and characterising radiological material, including being able to model and assess the geographic and health implications due to an event or incident.

Australian Safeguards and Non-proliferation Office, within DFAT, regulates nuclear safeguards within Australia to ensure that Australia meets non-proliferation and security treaty commitments and implements the Chemical Weapons Convention and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. ASNO is also involved in the development of domestic verification arrangements for the Biological Weapons Convention.

Australian Security Intelligence Organisation protects the nation and its interests from threats to security through intelligence collection, assessment, and advice for the Australian Government and state and territory governments and businesses.

Australian Signals Directorate counters terrorism by leveraging its foreign signals collection and analysis capabilities, and its unique relationships with key partners within the FVEY signals intelligence community.

The Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions is responsible for prosecuting persons for federal offences, including terrorism and foreign incursions offences.

Department of Defence (including ADF, AGO, DIO and DSTG) contributes directly to Australia's counter-terrorism efforts in support of the Australian Government's comprehensive whole-of-government approach to counter-terrorism – PPRR.

Defence supports domestic counter-terrorism efforts by assisting civil authorities, including but not limited to:

- providing specialist ADF capabilities to assist in the resolution of a terrorist act;
- intelligence support to decision makers;
- participating in exercises and training, and
- undertaking scientific research.

The *Defence Act 1903 (Cth)* allows Defence to be called on to assist civil authorities in emergencies during or following a terrorist incident, and may apply when a specific emergency is beyond the capabilities of the civil authorities to resolve, or where the ADF would be likely to enhance the civil authorities' response.

Defence supports the Australian Government's international counter-terrorism efforts through a range of contributions, including but not limited to participating in overseas operations providing intelligence support to decision makers; conducting training and capacity building support overseas; and engaging and cooperating with international partners.

The Defence Science and Technology Group (DSTG) has a mandated whole-of-government responsibility for coordinating national security science and technology through the National Security Science and Technology Centre (NSSTC). This role spans government, industry and academia to harness available science and technology expertise and resources for the application of national security agencies, including for any counter-terrorism role or responsibility they may perform. DSTG is responsible for:

- leading and coordinating the development and implementation of national security science and technology policy,
- fostering of international national security research collaborations,
- strategic analysis of national security priorities and resourcing, and
- integration of counter-terrorism technologies to benefit Defence and civilian agencies.

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade conducts international liaison designed to enhance international counter-terrorism arrangements and provides advice in relation to the protection of visiting foreign dignitaries. It also manages any "reverse consular" obligations that may arise if there were a terrorist act in Australia. It leads the International Engagement Mission to promote Australia's counter-terrorism interests through effective international advocacy, cooperation and capacity-building. DFAT undertakes contingency planning and crisis preparedness activities. The Department, through the IDETF, also coordinates the Australian Government's response to overseas crises, which includes overseas terrorist acts, including when involving Australians or Australian interests.

Department of Health and Aged Care

coordinates the health response to national incidents. The Department maintains the National Medical Stockpile – a strategic reserve of pharmaceuticals and personal protective equipment. It also develops and manages health sector emergency response plans for communicable diseases, CBRN and mass casualty incidents of national significance.

Department of Home Affairs, through the CTCC, provides support and coordination functions, including operational coordination, strategic policy, capability development, and ANZCTC coordination. The CTCC supports the Commonwealth Counter-Terrorism Coordinator to lead whole-of-government crisis coordination in response to a domestic terrorist event.

Home Affairs also provides policy coordination of critical infrastructure protection, countering violent extremism and cyber security. It facilitates the national coordination of public information.

Home Affairs delivers strategic communications programs to counter and contest the appeal of terrorist and violent extremist narratives and propaganda online, through the provision of positive alternative narratives.

Home Affairs coordinates CVE policy at the Commonwealth level and the activities of the Countering Violent Extremism Sub-Committee (CVESC). CVESC was established under the ANZCTC to ensure there is national coordination of CVE activities, including the sharing of information and the development of initiatives that are locally appropriate.

The CTCC works to undermine the appeal of violent extremist propaganda by partnering with communities and other influential individuals to discredit or trigger doubt in violent extremists, and to promote positive messages that build trust with and within key Australian communities.

Home Affairs continues to lead and support a variety of innovative initiatives to counter terrorist and violent extremist exploitation of the internet, including working with government and digital industry stakeholders and increasing community resilience to undermine the appeal of extremist narratives.

Home Affairs refers terrorist and violent extremist content to digital industry for consideration against their terms of service, where that material:

- provides instructions to commit an offence associated with terrorism
- is extremely graphic in nature; and
- expressly promotes or advocates violence against Australian individuals or organisations.

Home Affairs provides a key safeguard against unlawful interference with aviation and maritime transport and offshore oil and gas facilities. Home Affairs actively assists Australian critical infrastructure owners and operators to understand the risk environment and meet their regulatory requirements – for the shared benefit of all Australians. Home Affairs is the security regulator for these industries and provides advice to the Australian Government on transport security policy and practice. Home Affairs works with the intelligence community, government partners and industry to review threats and risks, and assesses how these could be prevented or deterred through regulatory and compliance activities.

Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications and the Arts oversees a number of initiatives related to countering-terrorism.

Surface Transport Policy Division provides a key safeguard against unlawful interference with aviation and maritime transport and offshore oil and gas facilities.

Home Affairs is the security regulator for these industries and provides advice to the Australian Government on transport security policy and practice. Home Affairs works with the intelligence community, government partners and industry to review threats and risks, and assesses how these could be prevented or deterred through regulatory and compliance activities.

DITRDCA's Online Safety, Media and Platforms Division is responsible for online safety policy, including oversight of the independent regulator, the eSafety Commissioner.

The eSafety legislative framework allows for the removal of seriously harmful online content (including terrorist content), or the rapid blocking of terrorism material in the event of an online crisis event. The Division also provides training and support to ABF and law enforcement officers on the classification of potential terrorist material and provides support to the Australian Classification Board, which assesses and classifies terrorist material RC (Refused Classification) which can be enforced under complementary state and territory legislation.

Department of Industry, Science and Resources has policy responsibility for certain critical infrastructure sectors, such as offshore resources, and portfolio responsibility for Australian Government entities that run nationally significant infrastructure, including the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation, Geoscience Australia, and the Australian Government Science and Industrial Research Organisation. It plays a coordination role in counter-terrorism prevention and response within such sectors and entities.

Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet advises the Prime Minister on matters relating to counter-terrorism, coordinates Australian Government policy responses to terrorism, and provides the secretariat for Cabinet Committees, SCNS, and DSCNS.

National Emergency Management Agency provides whole-of-government situational awareness via the Australian Government National Situation Room (NSR). The NSR also manages the National Security Hotline. NEMA manages a suite of national emergency management plans and coordinates Australian Government emergency management assistance to States and Territories.

Office of National Intelligence provides intelligence assessments on terrorism and violent extremism globally.

Threat Assessment Centre, located within ASIO, prepares assessments of the likelihood and possible nature of terrorism and protest violence, including against Australia, Australians and Australian interests here and abroad, special events and international interests in Australia.

TAC threat assessments support jurisdictions and agencies to make risk management decisions to determine how best to respond to the threat and mitigate risk.

Non-Government Organisations assist community recovery through the provision of emergency and ongoing welfare assistance.